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Marx – From Hegel and Feuerbach to Adam Smith: A New Synthesis* 
Eric Rahim 
Abstract  
In The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (completed in August 1844) Marx 
takes two crucial steps in the formation of his worldview. The first relates to his rejection of 
all ‘old’ materialism, including Feuerbach’s, and the adoption of his own version, which he 
called ‘communist’, ‘practical’. This view was later presented definitively in the first Thesis 
on Feuerbach (spring of 1845), and elaborated in The German Ideology (1845-46). The 
second step relates to Marx’s synthesising of the philosophical standpoint that he had 
developed up to this point (around the spring of 1844) with political economy. Up to this 
point he had spoken of alienation in largely philosophical terms; now it is rooted in the 
process of production. On both counts Adam Smith was an important influence. This claim 
provides the focus of this paper. To make this point successfully I have found it necessary to 
briefly trace the development of Marx’s philosophical standpoint up to the writing of the 
Manuscripts, and to distinguish between the two methodologically distinct aspects of Adam 
Smith’s thought, the one that Marx accepted and the other that he rejected.  
Introduction  
At the age of eighteen, in 1836, Marx joined Berlin University, and after a year 
of study there embraced Hegel’s philosophical system.1 From now on Hegel 
would be a major influence on his thinking and he would develop his own 
philosophical thought through a critique of him. Five years later he received his 
doctorate in philosophy. As the subject of his dissertation he had chosen 
‘Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature’. 
Marx considered Epicurus as the greater of the two thinkers. What attracted 
him to Epicurus was the activist element in his philosophy which Democritus’s 
materialism lacked.2  
                                                          
*This paper was presented at the conference ‘Marx 1818-2018, New Developments on Karl Marx’s Thought  
and Writings’ organised by the Research Centre Triangle and the European Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought, held in Lyon, France, from the 27th of September to the 29th, 2017. It is an extensively revised version 
of an earlier discussion paper ‘Marx: From Hegel and Feuerbach to Adam Smith’, no. 12-06.  
1 See his letter to his father dated November 10[-11], 1837, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, 
vol. 1, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1975, pp.10-21.  MECW, 1:10-21.   
2 Some years later Marx wrote: Epicurus ‘was the Enlightener of antiquity, he openly attacked the ancient 
religion, and it was from him, too, that the atheism of the Romans, insofar as it existed, was derived. For this 
reason, too, Lucretius praised Epicurus as the hero who was the first to overthrow the gods and trample 
religion underfoot, for this reason among all church leaders, from Plutarch to Luther, Epicurus has always had 
the reputation of being the atheist philosopher par excellence, and was called a swine ....’ MECW, 5:141-42.  
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Having failed to obtain an academic position Marx turned to political 
journalism. He started contributing to a newly-launched liberal bourgeois 
newspaper in Cologne, the Rheinische Zeitung, and soon became its editor. The 
theoretical perspective of Marx’s articles for the newspaper was provided by 
two ideas.3 First, Marx accepted the Hegelian organic view of society, rejecting 
thereby the principle of individualism, the view that society is a voluntary 
organisation, result of individual choices.4  
Second, although at this time Marx was thinking within the frame of Hegel’s 
notion that the state was an ethical entity, he was uncomfortable with his 
claim that the basic elements of the ethical state had been realised in the post-
Reformation states, such as Britain, France and the Netherlands (and even to 
an extent in Prussia).  The reality appeared to differ from the ideal.   
The first clear indication of Marx’s doubts about Hegel’s political philosophy 
that we find is in a letter he wrote to Arnold Ruge, the editor of a radical 
German journal, on the 5th of March, 1842. In this letter Marx promises to 
submit an article for publication in Ruge’s journal which ‘is a criticism of 
Hegelian philosophy of natural law insofar as it concerns the internal political 
system’ (Marx’s italics.)5 But Marx was unable to deliver the article.  
It has been plausibly suggested that the difficulty in writing the critique was 
the result of Marx not having the appropriate methodology and that this 
difficulty was resolved with the publication in February 1843 of Ludwig 
Feuerbach’s Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy.6 On reading the 
Theses, Marx wrote to Ruge (13th of March) that Feuerbach’s aphorisms seem 
to be incorrect only in one respect, in that he refers too much to nature and 
                                                          
3 According to one biographer of Marx, the latter’s articles ‘can be best understood as exercises in applied 
philosophy.’ Gareth Stedman Jones.. Karl Marx, Greatness and Illusion Allen Lane, UK. 2016, p.108.  
4 In one of his articles Marx wrote: ‘Whereas the earlier philosophers of constitutional law proceeded in their 
account of the formation of the state from the instincts, either of ambition or gregariousness, or even from 
reason, though not social reason, but reason of the individual, the more ideal and profound view of recent 
philosophy proceeds from the idea of the whole. It looks on the state as the great organism, in which legal, 
moral and political freedom must be realised, and in which the individual citizen in obeying the laws of the 
state obeys the natural laws of his own reason.’ MECW, 1:202.  
5 MECW, 1:383. This is a reference to paragraphs 257-321 of Hegel’s Outlines of the Philosophy of Right. In this 
part of the book Hegel’s presents constitutional arrangements aimed at integrating the individual with the 
state.  
6 See Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, Cambridge University Press, London, 1961, pp.96-
97; also Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, Cambridge University Press, London, 
1975, pp.9-10.  
3 
 
too little to politics. But it is politics which happens to be the only link through 
which contemporary philosophy can become true.’7  
Hegel’s philosophical idealism had attempted to solve the traditional problem 
of dualism between mind and matter, thought and reality, by postulating that 
reality is merely a projection of Mind or ‘world spirit’ (or ‘man’s process of 
thinking’, as Marx put it in his Afterword to the second edition of Capital.) 
thought and reality were a unity, reality was simply the alienated self of 
thought. Feuerbach reversed this relationship. Philosophy, he argued, should 
start with the real man and not with world spirit or thought. Thought proceeds 
from being, not being from thought. Man is not an attribute of world spirit or 
God, on the contrary, God is the expression of the thought process of man. He 
wrote: ‘Man – this is the mystery of religion – projects his being into 
objectivity, and then makes himself an object of this projected image of 
himself... Thus in God man has his own activity, an object. God is, per se, his 
relinquished self.’ 8 (This is the definition of man’s self-alienation in the realm 
of religion.)  And this is the materialist standpoint arrived at through an 
inversion of Hegel that Marx would use to develop his own critique of Hegel’s 
political philosophy.   
Marx resigned his editorship of the Rheinische Zeitung on the 17th of March (in 
any case the newspaper was going to be banned by the Prussian government), 
got married and settled down in his mother-in-law’s house in Kreuznach to 
work on his critique of Hegel’s political philosophy. Over the summer he wrote 
his Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law [Right], a 130-page 
(in the Collected Works edition) monograph. This work – to be referred as the 
Hegel Critique – written when Marx was 25 years old (in the words of one 
author) ‘demonstrate(s) that the distinctive patterns of Marx’s later thought 
had already taken   shape when he attacked Hegel’.9  
The Problem of Dualism in Society    
                                                          
7 MECW, 1:400.  
8 Quoted in Tucker, p.87.  
9 Avineri, p.13.  
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The aspect of Hegel’s political philosophy on which Marx directs his main 
criticism attempts to solve the problem of dualism in society.10 Marx shares 
Hegel’s problem. His critique is directed entirely on what he believes Hegel’s 
failure to resolve the problem.  
The problem for Hegel arose from the fact that modern capitalist society 
functions on the principle of individualism; that is, individuals pursue their 
private ends without regard to the interests of other members of society. And 
since under conditions of social division of labour and exchange, individuals 
must engage with each other, they are led to use others as means to their 
private ends. Civil society thus becomes (as he put it) the playground of 
competing interests which make for ‘ethical degeneration’.11  
Marx explained the problem at great length. The problem arose with the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism (neither Marx nor Hegel use the 
language of capitalism though both are dealing with it). As Marx sees it, there 
were two aspects of this transformation. First, there was a fundamental 
change in the nature of property. Under feudalism, as in all earlier forms of 
social organisation, property had a social dimension. For instance in the Middle 
Ages landed property was not freely disposable, and the serf had certain rights 
on the land he tilled. Under capitalism property received its purely economic 
form, discarding its former political and social associations.  
Second, there arose a clear distinction between the institutions of the state, 
the public domain,  and the domain of private interest, what Hegel had 
referred to as ‘civil society’; political rule became distant from the class 
structure of society. Such a distinction was absent in all earlier societies. Marx 
wrote in the Hegel Critique:  
In the Middle ages there  were serfs, feudal estates, merchants and trade guilds, 
corporations of scholars, etc.; that is to say, in the Middle Ages property, trade, society, man 
are political ...every private sphere has a political character or is a political sphere... In the 
Middle Ages the political constitution is the constitution of private property, but only 
                                                          
10 It needs to be pointed out that Hegel is not proposing a policy. In his thought philosophy can only interpret 
the world, not change it. The solution to the problem is already there. The significant elements of the 
constitutional arrangements he presents have, as noted earlier, already been realised in the post-Reformation 
developed European state.  
11 G.W.F. Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (translated by T.M. Knox) Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2008, p.182. 
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because the constitution of private property is a political constitution. In the Middle Ages 
the life of the nation and the life of the state are identical. Man is the actual principle of the 
state – unfree man. It is thus the democracy of unfreedom – estrangement carried to 
completion.12  
 Marx emphasised this point again and again: In the Middle Ages the economy 
was embedded in the political and social life.  ‘The estates of civil society and 
the estates in the political sense were identical, because civil society was 
political society – because the organic principle of civil society was the 
principle of the state.’13 And he continued the discussion in the article he 
wrote immediately after the Hegel Critique where he referred to dualism as 
‘the conflict between the general interest and the private interest, schism 
between the political state and civil society’, and referred to civil society as the 
sphere of egoism, of bellum omnium contra omnes.’14  
Hegel’s idea of the state as an ethical entity required resolution of the 
problem.  His theory had to recreate, at a higher level of development, the 
unity that characterised society before civil society (broadly speaking, the 
economy) became differentiated from the political sphere; it had to resolve 
the conflict between the state and civil society such that individuals lived by 
universal criteria, and the individualism or egoism that is the foundation of civil 
society was reined in. In other words, his theory has to achieve reconciliation 
between the general interest and the particular interest in the state, in the 
realm of social solidarity.  
Hegel’s Solution to the Problem of Dualism  
Hegel’s solution to the problem of dualism is a model of political and 
institutional structure that (he claims) is an idealised approximation to his ideal 
state. It consists of a hereditary, constitutional monarchy, the executive or 
bureaucracy appointed by the monarch which pursues only the general 
interest of society, and a two-chamber legislature. The upper chamber is based 
on hereditary peerage, referred to as the ‘agricultural’ or the ‘substantial’ 
estate. According to the medieval character of the estates system landowners 
attend the legislature in person (rather through elected delegates). Hegel 
                                                          
12 MECW, 3:32.  
13 Ibid. 72, see also p.82.  
14 ‘The war of all against all.’ ‘On the Jewish Question’, Ibid. p.155.  
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writes: ‘This estate is more particularly fitted for political position and 
significance in that its resources are independent alike of the state’s resources, 
the uncertainty of business, the quest for profit, and any sort of fluctuation in 
possession. It is likewise independent of favour, whether from the executive or 
the masses. It is even fortified against its own arbitrary will, because ... it is 
burdened with primogeniture.’15 The interest of the landowning class coincides 
with the general interest of society.  
It is the rest of civil society, the business world, that presents the problem. 
Individuals in this part of society are atomistically dispersed lacking ‘political 
cohesion.’16 
It is a fundamental premise of Hegel’s theoretical system that individual qua 
individual cannot be incorporated into the universality of the state. ‘A person 
with no estate is a mere private person and does not enjoy actual 
universality.17 What this means is that there must be institutions that ‘mediate’ 
between the individual and the state. The mediating institution in the sphere 
of industry and trade is the corporation, each trade or industry having its own 
such association. The corporation is a kind of ‘second family’ for its members.18  
Members of a corporation have common interests which are distinguished 
from the interests of those operating in other trades. The corporation will 
naturally look after these common interests. Members of a corporation will 
also have conflict of interest with each other. For instance, members compete 
with each other in the market. Hegel does not go into such mundane detail but 
we may assume that it will be the task of the corporation to manage internal 
competition. The central claim here is that through the corporation individuals 
learn to give greater priority to their common interests over individual 
interests and thus develop a greater sense of social solidarity. The corporation 
may thus be regarded as the first stage in the incorporation of the individual in 
the state organism. Deputies from various corporations come together in an 
estate. This is the second stage of mediation. And finally, delegates from this 
                                                          
15 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, pp.292-93.  
16 Ibid., pp.294-95.  
17 Ibid. p.197.  
18 Ibid. p.226. 
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estate (or the chamber), together with the estate representing the 
landowners, constitute the legislature.  
This is how in Hegel’s model, when it is brought down to earth from its 
metaphysical heights, the individualism and the conflicts of civil society are 
transcended, and the reconciliation of the private and public interest achieved. 
Civil society or the capitalist economy, which has now been purged of self-
interest, retains its autonomy. At the same time, the economy is overseen by a 
highly centralised state - it operates ‘under the surveillance of the public 
authority’19. Hegel’s is a corporatist capitalist economy in which competition is 
reined in. This may be seen as Hegel’s response to the challenge of classical 
political economy that achieves the coincidence of the public and private 
interest through the competitive market.  Hegel gives capitalism a 
philosophical expression, while classical political economy does it by 
constructing a theoretical model of a competitive economy.  Marx’s own 
thought will develop through a critique of both these approaches.  
Two Theoretical Advances 
A large part of the Hegel Critique is given to a detailed discussion of Hegel’s 
constitutional arrangements aimed at inte grating the individual with the state. 
Marx argues that the device of mediation fails to achieve the desired result. 
The delegates that make up the business estate (and the landowning class) 
attend to their own sectional interests. Hegel’s model is a rationalisation of the 
existing social reality.  
Marx’s first theoretical advance consists of the idea that Hegel conducts his 
analysis at the wrong end. He deduces reality, empirical facts, from the idea; 
he makes idea the determinant and the reality the determined. Marx thus 
extends Feuerbach’s materialist method from religion to politics. He writes: 
‘Just as it is not religion which creates man but man who creates religion, so it 
is not the constitution which creates the people but the people which creates 
the constitution.’20 Just as man is alienated from his own powers in the realm 
                                                          
19 Ibid. p.224.  
20 MECW, 3:29.  
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of religion, so is man in the political domain. Man confers his powers on 
institutions of his own creation which then come to dominate him.21  
As noted, Marx did for politics what Feuerbach did for religion, but with one 
difference. In Feuerbach the overcoming of alienation requires no more than 
an act of cognition, the realisation that man has alienated himself from his own 
powers. For Marx the reversal of the Hegelian relation directs attention to 
economic and social forces working in society, to social analysis. To retrieve 
the powers that man has conferred on the institutions of his own creation call 
for action.  
The second major advance (closely related to the first) made by Marx in the 
Hegel Critique refers to the nature of society. Earlier, Marx had, following 
Hegel, adopted the notion of the organic nature of society; he had noted that a 
great merit of Hegel’s philosophy was that it proceeded from ‘the idea of the 
whole’. But Hegel’s notion of society was metaphysical. He was not dealing 
with the real, empirical man.  Marx wrote: ‘Hegel starts from the state and 
makes man the subjectified state; democracy [Marx’s ideal political 
constitution] starts from man and makes state objectified man.’22  And again: 
‘This nonsense comes in because Hegel takes state functions and activities in 
abstract isolation, and the particular individuals in antithesis to them. He 
forgets, though, that the particular individual is human and that the functions 
and activities of the state are human functions. He forgets that the essence of 
a ‘particular’ personality is not its beard, its blood, its abstract physical 
character, but its social quality, and that state functions, etc., are nothing but 
modes of being and modes of action of the social qualities of men. Clearly, 
therefore, insofar as individuals are bearers of state functions and powers, 
they must be regarded in the light of their social and not their private 
quality.’23   
                                                          
21 Marx writes in the article ‘On the Jewish Question’: The alienated man ‘acknowledges himself only in a 
roundabout route, only through an intermediary. Religion is precisely the recognition of man in a roundabout 
way, through an intermediary. The state is the intermediary between man and his freedom. Just as Christ is the 
intermediary to whom man transfers the burden of his divinity, all his burden of divinity, all his religious 
constraint [bonds], so the state is the intermediary to whom man transfers all his non-divinity and all his 
unconstraint [freedom]’. Ibid. p.152.  
22 MECW, 3:29 
23 Ibid. pp.21-22.  
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Marx argues that man must be conceptualised in his historical and social 
context. Marx kept coming back to this idea of the socialised model of man, as 
opposed to the notion of the atomised society and Hegel’s abstractions again 
and again. This idea is articulated in the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts  composed a year later24; it is expressed in the sixth thesis on 
Feuerbach 25; and again in the Grundrisse 26.  
Man’s ‘human essence’, also referred to as man’s ‘communist essence’, derives 
from the empirical fact that man is an ensemble of his social relations. Marx 
rejected the principle of individualism – ‘the war of all against all’ - on 
empirical grounds. Contemporary society violated man’s ‘human essence’. This 
essence of man will only be realised in the ideal society of the future which will 
be based on the socialised model of man.  
In the article ‘On the Jewish Question’ that Marx wrote immediately after the 
Hegel Critique his critique of the contemporary society becomes more explicit 
and direct. And although at this stage he has not undertaken any serious study 
of literature on socialism, his thinking is definitely moving in that direction. The 
secular, liberal state, he argues, would certainly be a step forward in a semi-
feudal, autocratic country such as Prussia, but what political liberalism did was 
to sanctify the principle of individualism; the Rights of Man were the rights of 
an egoistic man. The right of man to private property is ‘the right to enjoy 
one’s property ... without regard to other men, independently of society, the 
right of self-interest.... It makes every man see in other men not the realisation 
of his own freedom, but the barrier to it.’27 Marx was now talking of a social 
revolution.   
Here Marx takes the first step towards his conception of man’s alienation in 
the economic sphere or man’s alienation in his productive activity, an idea he 
will develop fully a few months later in his Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts. He writes here: ‘Just as man, so long as he is engrossed in 
religion, can only objectify his nature by turning it into an alien creature of the 
fantasy, so, under the domination of egoistic need, he can act in a practical 
                                                          
24 MECW,  3: 
25 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Selected Works in two volumes,, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
Moscow, 1958.,  MESW, .2:404. 
26 David McLellan, Marx’s Grundrisse. Paladin, St. Albans, Herts. 1973, p.89. 
27 MECS,3:163.  
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way, create objects practically, only by subordinating these products as well as 
his activity to the power of an alien being – money.’28   
Within three months Marx wrote another article in which he argued that social 
criticism must lead to social action, and introduced the new and original idea 
that the proletariat will be the agent of social revolution.29 In this article Marx 
sharpened his materialist standpoint. He argued that the criticism of religion in 
Germany had remained in the Feuerbachian anthropological frame without 
leading to social criticism. Religion is man’s inverted consciousness because the 
world that produces religion is an inverted world. The struggle against religion 
is, therefore, struggle against the existing social conditions.  
Who will then lead the struggle to achieve social revolution in Germany? By an 
interesting twist of logic, Marx argues that while in countries like France 
political emancipation (bourgeois revolution) can eventually lead to human 
emancipation (social revolution), in Germany, which is unable to arrive at 
human emancipation through the intermediate stage of a political revolution, 
human, universal emancipation becomes ‘the conditio sine qua non of any 
political emancipation. Thus, German emancipation lies in the 
‘.... formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil 
society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal 
character by its universal suffering and claims no particular right because no particular 
wrong but wrong generally is perpetrated against it; which can no longer invoke a historical 
but only a human title; which does not stand in any one-sided antithesis to the 
consequences but in an all-round antithesis to the premises of the German state; a sphere, 
finally, which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of 
society and thereby emancipating all other spheres of society, which, in a word, is the 
complete loss of man and hence can win itself only through the complete rewinning of man. 
This dissolution of society as a particular estate is the proletariat.30  
 
In less than eight months, from the spring of 1843 and January 1844, at the age 
of 25, Marx had assembled some of the most important elements of his 
mature worldview. He had started with the Hegelian concept of the ideal 
society and had given it materialist content. He had grasped the foundational 
concept of communism, in which the dichotomy between the personal, 
egoistic interest and the universal interest of society, the alienation of the 
                                                          
28 Ibid. p171.  
29 ‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law [Right]: Introduction’. This article was written in 
January 1844, and with ‘On the Jewish Question’ was published in the Deutsch-Franzoesische Jahrbuecher in 
Paris that Marx co-edited.  
30 MECW, 3:186. 
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individual from the political process, is overcome. It will be a society without 
the right to private property. And he had identified the agency – the proletariat 
– that will lead the revolution to achieve the ideal society.  
However, a number of the important elements of the worldview were of 
course missing. As noted, in this paper I focus on two that Marx takes up in the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts on both of which Adam Smith exerted 
an important influence.  
First, before Marx started working on the Manuscripts he was exclusively 
ploughing the philosophical field. For instance, the leading role of the 
proletariat in the social revolution is attributed to its ‘universal suffering’, and 
there is hardly any reference to the internal class structure of the 
contemporary society he is criticising. All that changes in the Manuscripts. Here 
Marx integrates some of the insights, concepts and relationships provided by 
Smith’s   political economy into his philosophical standpoint. There is a new 
synthesis.  
 Second, at least up till August (1844) Marx had thought that Feuerbach’s 
materialism could form the basis of communism. He wrote to that effect to 
Feuerbach in a letter of 11 August.31 Later he came to recognise that all 
‘previous’ materialism, including Feuerbach’s, led to passivity and therefore it 
could not provide a basis for communism, and formulated his own version 
which he referred to as ‘practical’, ‘communist. This new version was first 
proclaimed in the first thesis on Feuerbach (written in the spring of 1845). The 
crucial transition to the new version takes place in the Manuscripts where 
Marx gives full credit to Adam Smith.  
Two Aspects of Adam Smith’s Thought   
Marx’s studies in Paris (where he lived from October 1843 until the end of 
1844) covered a variety of subjects. As was his habit, he made extensive notes 
on the works he studied. These notes have been referred to as the Paris 
Notebooks. In the Notebooks there was a set of notes that pertained 
particularly to political economy. These notes were extracted from the 
Notebooks by the editors of his works, given a systematic form and published 
in 1932 under the title The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.  
 Although Marx studied the works of a number of political economists the 
author with whom he engaged most intimately was Adam Smith. It was with 
                                                          
31 Ibid. p.354.  
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reference to The Wealth of Nations that he exclaimed: ‘Political economy has 
merely formulated the laws of alienated labour.32   
We have here something of a paradox. How come that the founder of a 
worldwide movement against capitalism should find his source of inspiration in 
the work of the most respected prophet of capitalism?  
The paradox is soon resolved when we observe that there are two 
methodologically distinct aspects in Adam Smith’s thought.   
One aspect is theoretical and scientific in which Smith identifies an objective 
phenomenon, the causes of the increase in the wealth of a nation in specific 
historical conditions, conceptualises the existing mode of production 
(‘commercial’, that is, capitalist economy), studies its functioning, its law- 
determined regularity. Marx inherited this aspect of Smith’s work, and through 
a critique of it developed his own economic thought. The second aspect relates 
to Smith’s social philosophy.  
This latter aspect is briefly outlined in the following paragraphs. The first – the 
scientific aspect - is the subject of the three sections that follow.  
In his social philosophy, Smith adopts the principle of individualism. Society is 
seen essentially in terms of exchange. It needs to be emphasised that Smith 
was not a blatant individualist preaching greed and egotism. He believed that 
‘all members of human society stand in need of each others assistance’; and 
that society flourishes when ‘the necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded 
from love’. But when this is not possible  
Society may subsist among different men, as among different merchants, from sense of 
utility, without any mutual love or affection; and though no man in it should owe any 
obligation, or bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be upheld by a mercenary 
exchange of good offices according to an agreed valuations.33  
In its economic aspects at least, Smith appears to subscribe to the social 
contract theory in which society is seen as a voluntary organisation, society as 
a market.  
                                                          
32 Ibid. p.291. 
33 Theory of Moral Sentiments.edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976, pp.85-
86.  
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The essential point here is exchange, man’s ‘natural propensity’ to ‘truck and 
barter’. The phenomenon of division of labour, for instance, follows from that 
propensity. In the chapter ‘Of the Principle which gives occasion to the Division 
of Labour’ in The Wealth of Nations, he writes: ‘It [division of labour] is the 
necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity 
in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to 
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.’34  In the same vein, the 
origin of money is attributed to the same propensity.35  
We note here also the idea of the immutability of human nature – the 
assumption of ‘abstract man’, without any historical and social conditioning. 
‘The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his 
condition, the principle from which publick and national, as well as private 
opulence is originally derived’36 seems to be the driving force for capital 
accumulation and economic development. One can take the view that at least 
in this aspect of his thought, Smith seems to take the view that the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism was the result of the working of this ‘natural 
propensity’ – the desire of every man to improve his condition leading to 
victory over the artificial restrictions that governments had placed on man’s 
desire to better his condition.  
Finally, we have Smith’s most important theorem: The operation of 
competitive markets, that is, free mobility of capital and labour across 
different economic activities, will lead to a state of ‘natural balance’ (general 
equilibrium) of the economy. ‘The natural price ... is ... the central price to 
which all prices of all commodities are continually gravitating. ...But whatever 
may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this center of repose 
and continuance, they are constantly tending towards it.’37  
But Smith goes beyond this scientific proposition. He claims that this situation 
of unhindered resource mobility leads not only to the ‘natural balance’ of the 
                                                          
34 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of Nations, edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1976,  vol. 1, p.25.  
35 Ibid. pp.36-7.  
36 Ibid.  p.343. 
37 Ibid. p.75. It is worth noting that the meaning of the word ‘natural’ in this theoretical proposition is entirely 
different from that in Smith’s social philosophy, where he talks of man’s ‘natural propensity’ to better his 
condition.  
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economy, but also to the general coincidence of the private interest and 
general interest. The individual while pursuing his own interest also at the 
same time is led by an invisible had to promote the general interest of 
society.38 This latter conclusion is derived entirely pragmatically: in a 
competitive market producers will be free, and choose, to invest in lines of 
production that offer them the highest profits, and workers will seek 
employment in industries and firms where they find the highest rewards for 
their abilities and skills. In these circumstances the wealth of the nation would 
be maximised, and the conditions for economic progress would be the most 
conducive. Smith associates the increasing wealth of the nation with increasing 
general prosperity, and the latter with the ‘general interest’ of society. The 
coincidence of the two takes place in the competitive market. There is no 
theoretical basis for this claim.   
We turn now to the other aspect of Smith’s thought that made a significant 
contribution to the development of Marx’s worldview.  
 Adam Smith as the Martin Luther of Political Economy  
The very first sentence of The Wealth of Nations reads: ‘The  annual labour of 
every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessaries and 
conveniences of life which it annually consumes, and which consists always, 
either in the immediate product of that labour, or in what is purchased with 
that produce from other nations.’  
Marx did not read this sentence as a mere rhetorical flourish. He observed that 
Smith’s political economy had acknowledged labour as its principle. He wrote: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
To this enlightened political economy, which has discovered – within private property – the 
subjective essence of wealth, the adherents of the monetary and mercantile system, who 
look upon private property only as an objective substance confronting men, seem therefore 
to be fetishists, Catholics. Engels was therefore right to call Adam Smith the Luther of 
                                                          
38 The Wealth of Nations, vol. I, p.456. It is interesting that Smith makes the claim regarding the working of the 
invisible hand in book IV, chapter II ‘Of Restraint upon the Importation from foreign Countries of such Goods 
as can be produced at Home’ and not in book I, chapter VII where he discusses the  theoretical proposition 
regarding the natural balance of the economy. He writes in book IV, chapter II: ‘By preferring the support of 
domestick to that of foreign industry, he [the individual] intends only his own security; and by directing that 
industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is 
in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.’ 
He makes the same point on p.454 in the same chapter and in book IV, chapter VII ‘Of Colonies’, p.630.   
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Political Economy. Just as Luther recognised religion – faith – as the substance of the  
external  world and in consequence stood opposed to Catholic paganism – just as he 
superseded external religiosity by making religiosity the inner substance of man – just as he 
negated the priests outside the layman because he transplanted the priest into layman’s 
heart, just so with wealth: wealth as something outside man and independent of him, and 
therefore as something to be maintained and asserted only in an external fashion is done 
away with; that is , this external, mindless objectivity of wealth is done  away with, with 
private property being incorporated in man himself and with him being recognised as its 
essence.’ 39  
Marx sees Smith as conceiving wealth as materialised labour. As noted, this 
idea which will appear in a more general form – extending it to all reality - in 
the first Thesis on Feuerbach is the first clear and definite intimation of Marx’s 
own version of materialism. In the first Thesis on Feuerbach Marx rejected all 
‘previous’ materialism, including Feuerbach’s. Previous materialism accepted 
the duality of matter and mind and gave primacy to matter. Reality was 
something ‘external’, objective, given, and mind (for Marx this meant man) 
was conceived as passive. This is the crucial point. This is how (as Marx sees it) 
mercantilists conceived wealth, as something ‘external’ to man. Smith, by 
saying that it is nothing but materialised labour, did away with this ‘mindless 
objectivity of wealth’.  
In The German Ideology (written with Engels, 1845-46) this idea is elaborated 
when Marx distinguishes between ‘original’ nature and ‘historical’ nature (that 
is, ‘nature’ made by man).  
He [Feuerbach] does not see that the sensuous world around him is not a thing given direct 
from eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the society; and, 
indeed [a product] in the sense that it is a historical product, the result of activity of a whole 
succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing 
its industry and its intercourse, and modifying its social system according to the changed   
needs. Even the objects of the simplest ‘sensuous certainty’ are given him through social 
development, industry and commercial intercourse. The cherry tree, like almost all fruit 
trees, was, as is well known, only a few centuries ago transplanted by commerce into our 
zone, and therefore only by this action of a definite society in a definite age has it become 
‘sensuous certainty’ for Feuerbach.’40   
                                                          
39 MECW, 3:290-91. Engel’s reference to Adam Smith as ‘the economic Luther’ is made in his ‘Outlines of a 
Critique of Political Economy’ published in the Deutsch-Franzoesische Jahrbuecher. MECW, 3:422.  
40 MECW, 5:39.  
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Marx emphasises this point again and again. If man’s activity were interrupted 
only for a year we would not only find an enormous change in the natural 
world, we would find the very existence of mankind threatened.  
 For that matter, nature, the nature that preceded human history, is not by any means the 
nature in which Feuerbach lives, it is nature which today no longer exists anywhere (except 
perhaps on a few Australian coral islands of recent origin) and which, therefore does not 
exist for Feuerbach either. 41   
 If man creates the reality in which he lives, he can also change it. This is the 
activist element that Marx incorporated into his own version of materialism 
which he referred to as ‘practical’, ‘historical’, and ‘communist’. The basis for 
this standpoint was clearly laid down when he referred to Smith as the Luther 
of political economy.42   
Conceptualising Capitalism   
Built into Smith’s concept of wealth is the notion of economic reproduction, a 
process that takes place in real time. This year’s cycle of production starts with 
the inputs, including labour’s subsistence, inherited from the preceding year; 
these inputs that are used up are reproduced (with a surplus), and used in the 
following year. When part of the surplus is re-invested we have economic 
expansion. Marx could not have failed to see here the Hegelian notion of 
evolution. It is a situation of internally generated development or expanded 
self-reproduction without the involvement of any extraneous factor.  
The concept of reproduction is central to Marx’s theory of historical 
development. According to The German Ideology: ‘History is nothing but the 
succession of the separate generations, each of which uses the materials, 
capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all the preceding 
generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in 
completely changed circumstances, and on the other, modifies the old 
circumstances with a completely changed activity.’43   
                                                          
41 Ibid. p.40. 
42 It is interesting that although at this point Marx has broken away from all ‘previous materialism’, including 
Feuerbach’s, he still at this time (when he is writing the Manuscripts) regards Feuerbach’s philosophy as being 
capable of providing a basis of communism.  See Marx’s letter of 11 August 1844.  MECW, 3:354.  
43 MECW, 5:50.  
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Further, Adam Smith sees the production of wealth as a social activity, a 
collective enterprise. It takes the form of social division of labour. Different 
productive activities or industries complement each other and are thus 
‘necessary to the existence of each other’.44 In the very first chapter of The 
Wealth of Nations, Smith illustrates this phenomenon with reference to the 
manufacture of a day-labourer’s woollen coat. , ‘Observe the accommodation 
of the most common artificer or day-labourer in a civilized and thriving country 
and you will perceive that the number of people whose industry a part, though 
but a small part, has been employed in procuring him this accommodation, 
exceeds all computation.’ From the raising of the sheep, etc. to sorting, 
combing, spinning, weaving, transportation of the materials, the manufacture 
of tools and machinery for use in these activities, and so on and on – all these 
activities are involved in the production of this item which becomes ‘the 
produce of the joint labour of a great multitude of workmen.’45(Emphasis 
added.)  Individual labour has become social labour.    
The features of an economy outlined above are of a general nature; to various 
degrees they hold for all forms of human society. For example, all societies are 
characterised by some degree of social division of labour and of course they all 
reproduce themselves over time (if they did not, society would cease to exist). 
Such features of an economy may be considered of a technical nature.  
Adam Smith’s analysis of the conditions under which the wealth of a nation is 
produced and expands is set specifically in the social organisation he calls ‘the 
commercial society’, that is, modern capitalism. It is his conceptualisation of 
such an economy with the specific purpose of investigating the factors that lie 
behind economic development that determine the structure of classical 
political economy and gives it its scientific character. It is this analysis that 
makes an important contribution to the social theory that Marx will develop 
later. It is also here that we see Adam Smith departing from his individual-
focused social philosophy.  
In Smith’s model the ‘commercial society’ is divided into three social classes. 
These are defined in terms of the nature of the resources they own and their 
place in the production system. Landowners have no productive function and 
                                                          
44 The Wealth of Nations, vol. 1, p.360.  
45 Ibid. p.22.  
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they derive their income – rent of land – from a resource that is naturally 
scarce, in the sense that (unlike capital goods and labour skills) it is not 
reproducible. There are suggestions in his discussion of rent that there is 
conflict of interest between the landed class and the capitalist class (and 
society, more generally) – suggestions that Ricardo will later develop with the 
utmost rigour.  
The central relation in the production system is that between the capitalist 
class and labour. The capitalist class consists of those who have accumulated 
capital (in the form of purchasing power) and who will ‘naturally employ it in 
setting to work industrious people, whom they will supply with materials and 
subsistence, in order to make a profit by the sale of their work’.46 Workers, as a 
class do not own capital and means of their subsistence and therefore they 
‘stand in need of a master to advance them the materials of their work, and 
their subsistence and maintenance till it [the product] be compleated.’47   
The relationship between the two classes is one of power and latent 
antagonism.  For the capitalist labour’s wages are a cost like any other, say, 
feed for farm animals. Higher costs mean lower profits and the capitalist must 
therefore strive to have wages as low as possible. Workers, on the other hand, 
want their wages to be as high as possible. We have here two parties ‘whose 
interests are by no means the same. The workmen desire to get as much, the 
masters to give as little as possible. The former are disposed to combine in 
order to raise, the latter in order to lower the wages of labour.’ Smith adds: ‘It 
is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all 
ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into 
a compliance with their terms.’48     
Smith then goes on to enumerate all the factors that work in favour of the 
masters. The only factor that works in favour of the workers is capital 
accumulation and economic expansion. Under these conditions when national 
prosperity is on the rise, and the demand for labour is buoyant, wages can rise 
above the level that is ‘consistent with common humanity’.49  
                                                          
46 Ibid. pp.65-66.  
47 Ibid. p.83.  
48 Ibid. pp.83-84.  
49 Ibid. p.86.  
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However, although in this situation the conflict between capital and labour 
may be kept under check, the fundamental fact of the relationship of power 
and latent antagonism between the two classes remains unchanged.   
On reading The Wealth of Nations, Marx must have felt that Adam Smith had 
already loaded the gun for him.  
The Generalisation of the Concept of Alienation  
The most important accomplishment of the Manuscripts is the generalisation 
of the concept of alienation. Until now Marx had been, as noted, exclusively 
ploughing the philosophical field. Economic alienation now takes centre stage   
and this concept is now expressed in the capital-labour relation, in production.  
The first form of economic alienation Marx identified is the alienation of the 
worker from his product. This form of alienation - ‘a fact of political economy’50 
- is derived fundamentally from the capital-labour relationship as found in 
Smith. Marx’s starting point is Smith’s statement (quoted in the preceding 
section) that all wealth, consisting of commodities, is produced by labour. Just 
as the religious man had ‘objectified’ or ‘externalised’ himself in the gods; just 
as the state was the ‘externalisation’ of man in the form of political power; in 
the same way labour ‘objectifies’ or ‘externalises’ itself in its product.  Capital, 
since it consists of produced commodities, is also produced by labour, it is 
accumulated labour.  Capital (Marx quotes Smith) is a ‘certain quantity of 
labour stocked and stored up to be employed’; and again, ‘The person who 
[either acquires, or] succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily [acquire, 
or] succeed to any political power […] The power which that possession 
immediately and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchasing; a certain 
command over the labour, over all the produce of labour, which is in the 
market.’  Marx concludes: ‘Capital is thus the governing power over labour and 
its products.’51  
In the very first paragraph of the ‘First Manuscript’, Marx paraphrases some of 
the observations from the chapter ‘Of the Wages of Labour’ in The Wealth of 
Nations, highlighting the relationship of power between capital and labour and   
the capitalist’s ability to appropriate labour’s product. ‘His own labour as 
                                                          
50 MECW, 3:278.  
51 Ibid. p.247.  
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another man’s property and that the means of his existence and activity are 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of the capitalist.’   
All these consequences are implied in the statement that the worker is related to the 
product of his labour as to an alien object.... The alienation of the worker in his product 
means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists 
outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its 
own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts 
him as something hostile and alien.’52  
To repeat: through its social power, capital, itself the product of labour, is able 
to appropriate labour’s product; labour’s own creation becomes a power over 
it. This is labour’s alienation from its product.  
The second form of alienation manifests itself in the act of production, ‘in the 
labour process’.53  The product from which the worker is alienated is but the 
result of his productive activity. ‘How could the worker (Marx asks) come to 
face the product of his activity as a stranger, were it not that in the very act of 
production he was estranging himself from himself? The product is after all but 
the summary of the activity of production.’54   
Marx starts from the premise that productive activity is an aspect of man’s   
‘essence’.55 His need to engage in productive activity goes beyond the need 
merely to maintain his physical existence. It is through ‘conscious life activity’ 
that man asserts his humanity, his ‘species character’. Labour performed for 
the capitalist is labour solely aimed at physical existence; it is external to man’s 
intrinsic need. It is a case of self-estrangement.   
When man is estranged from himself, he is necessarily estranged from other 
human beings. This follows from the standpoint that man’s ‘species character’ 
is essentially social. As noted, for Marx society is nothing but the sum of the 
relationships in which individuals find themselves. Here he  writes: ‘The 
estrangement of man, in fact every relationship in which man [stands] to 
                                                          
52 Ibid. p.272.  
53 Ibid. p.275.  
54 Ibid. p.274. 
55 Giving credit to Hegel for having recognised this, Marx wrote: ‘Hegel’s standpoint is that of political 
economy. He grasps labour as the essence of man ... [but] the only labour which Hegel knows and recognises is 
abstractly mental labour.’ Ibid. p.333.  
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himself, is realised and expressed only in the relationship in which man stands 
to other men.’56  
We see here Marx moving towards what is perhaps the most momentous 
theoretical achievement in the development of his synthesis between his 
philosophical standpoint and the scientific discipline of classical political 
economy.  
Hence within the relationship of estranged labour each man views the other in accordance 
with the standard and the relationship in which man finds himself as a worker [as a 
producer]. (Emphasis added).57  
Before his encounter with classical political economy (as noted earlier) the 
proletariat’s role in ‘human emancipation’ was vaguely and un-empirically 
attributed to its ‘universal suffering’ and ‘sheer necessity’. Now he speaks of 
the relationship of the worker to other workers and workers’ relationship with 
capital in the context of production. This is the critical point of transition;   
before he spoke vaguely of the ‘power of money’, now he talks of the ‘wage-
system’58 and identifies it with the system of private property; the abolition of 
one, he says, implies the abolition of the other. It is only when the wage-
system is abolished that ‘universal emancipation’ will be achieved. He writes:  
From the relationship of estranged labour to private property it follows further that the 
emancipation of society from private property, etc., from servitude, is expressed in the 
political form of the emancipation of the workers; not that their emancipation alone is at 
stake, but because the emancipation of the workers contains universal human emancipation 
– and it contains this, because the whole of human servitude is involved in the relation of the 
worker to production, and all relations of servitude are but modifications and consequences 
of this relation.59 [Emphasis added.]  
The source of all forms of alienation and man’s powerlessness are to be found 
in the relations that arise in the process of production. Material relations 
determine all other relations.  
 
                                                          
56 Ibid. p.277. see also p.278.  
57 Ibid. p.278.  
58 Marx uses the word ‘wages’ instead of the wage-system, but from the context it is clear that he means the 
latter.   
59 Ibid. p.280.  
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Summary and a Further Comment  
Marx started by adopting some of the important aspects of Hegel’s philosophy, 
in particular the organic view of society, rejecting the principle of 
individualism, and the concept of an ideal society. The ideal society was one in 
which the individual was integrated with society, where the dichotomy 
between the private interest and the general interest had been overcome. 
Marx’s own political philosophy developed as an internal critique of Hegel and 
his former Young Hegelian friends. Hegel had failed to resolve the problem he 
had set out to resolve and had ended up by sanctioning the existing economic 
and political reality. Young Hegelians were arguing for Prussia to undergo a 
‘political revolution’ of the type that developed countries such as Britain, 
France and the Netherland had gone through. ‘Political revolution’ sanctioned 
the principle of individualism, the right to enjoy one’s property without any 
regard to others, it was a society with a state of war of all against all. Marx was 
arguing for a ‘social revolution’ to be led by the working class. Marx had 
rejected capitalism as a form of social organisation before he started his 
studies in political economy. In the course of these studies he found that one 
aspect of Adam Smith’s political economy neatly complemented his 
philosophical standpoint, that it had (as he put it) merely formulated the laws 
of alienated labour. At the same time Smith’s political economy had, like 
Hegel, failed to resolve the dichotomy between the private interest and the 
general interest. Marx’s own economic thought would develop as an internal 
critique of political economy (just as his philosophical thought had developed 
as an internal critique of Hegel).  
 
One of Marx’s major criticisms of political economy would be that it treated 
the capitalist system as eternal; there had been history before but that was no 
longer the case. In the Manuscripts, Marx takes his first step in that direction. 
In Smith’s system, economic development remains strictly within the frame of 
competitive capitalist relations. This view of the permanence of the capitalist 
system may be compared with Smith’s own understanding of historical 
development before the emergence of capitalism.60 He had traced human 
                                                          
60 For discussion of historical development, see chapter one of Book five, also chapters two and three of Book 
three of The Wealth of Nations. .  
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progress through four distinct stages identified as socio-economic 
organisational forms based on hunting and food gathering, ‘nations of 
shepherds’, followed by the feudal society which gave way to the 
contemporary commercial society. Smith was taking the existing property 
relations as a given datum, not only for analysing the working of the capitalist 
economy (which was legitimate and necessary), but also for understanding 
historical development. This is how Marx saw it.   
Marx’s own mature theory of capitalist development, by contrast with the 
Smithian schema, will attempt to show that there are forces inherent in the 
logic of the capitalist economy that will drive its evolution beyond the 
bourgeois horizon set for it by classical political economy. He will reach this 
result through an internal critique of the classical theory.   
Marx’s first step in that direction is the observation referring to the 
concentration of capital in fewer and fewer hands as a necessary aspect of 
capital accumulation. Of particular interest here is the quotation from the 
‘Introduction’ to Book two of The Wealth of Nations where Smith discusses the 
relationship between capital accumulation, increase in the division of labour 
(in the plant) and increase in labour productivity. Implicit in this relationship is 
the phenomenon of economies of scale.  Marx recounts numerous advantages 
that larger enterprises enjoy over smaller ones. In a competitive environment 
some enterprises will manage to get bigger and then, because of the 
advantages of size they enjoy, will begin to ‘squeeze’ the smaller ones out of 
the market. This is how, concentration of capital in fewer hands takes place.61 
‘Accumulation, where  private property prevails, is the concentration of capital 
in the hands of a few, it is in general an inevitable consequence if capital is left 
to follow its natural course, and it is precisely through competition that the 
way is cleared for this natural disposition of capital’62. This process will 
fundamentally alter the structure of capitalism. Further, with the 
concentration of capital, both in individual enterprises and regions comes, 
necessarily, the concentrations of labour, which, in turn, is a necessary 
condition for the development of working people’s class consciousness. These 
considerations will lead to the conviction that the ingredients for the 
                                                          
61 MECW, 3:252. 
62 Ibid. p.251.  
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transformation of capitalism lie within its own manner of functioning, its 
inherent logic.63  
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63 This aspect of Marx’s critique of classical political economy is fully developed in his Poverty of Philosophy 
published in 1847. Criticising political economy, he writes: According to ‘economists’  ‘relations [of bourgeois 
production ] therefore are themselves natural laws independent of the influence of time. They are eternal laws 
which must always govern society. Thus there has been history, but there is no longer any.’ These laws are as 
transient as those of all pre-capitalist forms of social organisation. MECW 6:174.  
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